The 9/11 Commission: Fast Facts

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also known as the 9/11 Commission) published its report July 22, 2004. This independent, bipartisan panel was created in late 2002. Here is a brief review of what they found out and what recommendations they made for both global strategy and reorganizing government.

A. What to Do? A Global Strategy -- Defining the Threat: In section 12 of its report, the commission points out that the nature of security threats has changed. "In the post-9/11 world, threats are defined more by the fault lines within societies than by the territorial boundaries between them."

"Now threats can emerge quickly. An organization like al Qaeda, headquartered in a country on the other side of the earth, in a region so poor that electricity or telephones were scarce, could nonetheless scheme to wield weapons of unprecedented destructive power in the largest cities of the United States.

In this sense, 9/11 has taught us that terrorism against American interests "over there" should be regarded just as we regard terrorism against America "over here."

"But the enemy is not just "terrorism," some generic evil. This vagueness blurs the strategy.The catastrophic threat at this moment in history is more specific. It is the threat posed by Islamist terrorism-especially the al Qaeda network, its affiliates, and its ideology."

B. Who Is the Enemy? The report names two enemies and notes that Islam itself is not the enemy.

"Our enemy is twofold: al Qaeda, a stateless network of terrorists that struck us on 9/11; and a radical ideological movement in the Islamic world, inspired in part by al Qaeda, which has spawned terrorist groups and violence across the globe. The first enemy is weakened, but continues to pose a grave threat. The second enemy is gathering, and will menace Americans and American interests long after Usama Bin Ladin and his cohorts are killed or captured. Thus our strategy must match our means to two ends: dismantling the al Qaeda network and prevailing in the longer term over the ideology that gives rise to Islamist terrorism."

"Islam is not the enemy. It is not synonymous with terror. Nor does Islam teach terror. America and its friends oppose a perversion of Islam, not the great world faith itself. Lives guided by religious faith, including literal beliefs in holy scriptures, are common to every religion, and represent no threat to us."

C. What Strategy Should the U.S. Pursue? Section 12 continues: "What is needed is a broad political-military strategy that rests on a firm tripod of policies to:

attack terrorists and their organizations;

prevent the continued growth of Islamist terrorism; and

protect against and prepare for terrorist attacks.

D. Measuring Success: The report notes that the goal of national security seems limitless: "Defeat terrorism anywhere in the world." The commission continues, "With such benchmarks, the justifications for action and spending seem limitless. Goals are good. Yet effective public policies also need concrete objectives."

The report also notes that Al Queda is not invicible or omnipotent. The group made mistakes even in its preparation for 9/11. The U.S. government just did not capitalize on those mistakes.

The report continues: "We do not believe it is possible to defeat all terrorist attacks against Americans, every time and everywhere. A president should tell the American people:

No president can promise that a catastrophic attack like that of 9/11 will not happen again. History has shown that even the most vigilant and expert agencies cannot always prevent determined, suicidal attackers from reaching a target.

But the American people are entitled to expect their government to do its very best. They should expect that officials will have realistic objectives, clear guidance, and effective organization. They are entitled to see some standards for performance so they can judge, with the help of their elected representatives, whether the objectives are being met.

E. Recommendations for Global Strategy: The commission made many recommendations, supported and explained by additional text. Here is a condensed summary of some global strategy recommendations; to read the full text see Section 12 of the report.

The U.S. government must identify and prioritize actual or potential terrorist sanctuaries. For each, it should have a realistic strategy to keep possible terrorists insecure and on the run, using all elements of national power. We should reach out, listen to, and work with other countries that can help.

The President and the Congress deserve praise for their efforts in Afghanistan so far. Now the United States and the international community should make a long-term commitment to a secure and stable Afghanistan, in order to give the government a reasonable opportunity to improve the life of the Afghan people. Afghanistan must not again become a sanctuary for international crime and terrorism.

The problems in the U.S.-Saudi relationship must be confronted, openly. The United States and Saudi Arabia must determine if they can build a relationship that political leaders on both sides are prepared to publicly defend-a relationship about more than oil.

The U.S. government must define what the message is, what it stands for. We should offer an example of moral leadership in the world, committed to treat people humanely, abide by the rule of law, and be generous and caring to our neighbors. America and Muslim friends can agree on respect for human dignity and opportunity.

Where Muslim governments, even those who are friends, do not respect these principles, the United States must stand for a better future.

Just as we did in the Cold War, we need to defend our ideals abroad vigorously.

The U.S. government should offer to join with other nations in generously supporting a new International Youth Opportunity Fund. Funds will be spent directly for building and operating primary and secondary schools in those Muslim states that commit to sensibly investing their own money in public education.

Vigorous efforts to track terrorist financing must remain front and center in U.S. counterterrorism efforts. The government has recognized that information about terrorist money helps us to understand their networks, search them out, and disrupt their operations.

Targeting travel is at least as powerful a weapon against terrorists as targeting their money. The United States should combine terrorist travel intelligence, operations, and law enforcement in a strategy to intercept terrorists, find terrorist travel facilitators, and constrain terrorist mobility.

The Department of Homeland Security, properly supported by the Congress, should complete, as quickly as possible, a biometric entry-exit screening system, including a single system for speeding qualified travelers. It should be integrated with the system that provides benefits to foreigners seeking to stay in the United States.

As the President determines the guidelines for information sharing among government agencies and by those agencies with the private sector, he should safeguard the privacy of individuals about whom information is shared.

Emergency response agencies nationwide should adopt the Incident Command System (ICS). When multiple agencies or multiple jurisdictions are involved, they should adopt a unified command.

-- Continued on Page 2

SOURCES:

"National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States." 2004. http://www.9-11commission.gov/.